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INTRODUCTION 
A popular trope about long marriages is that they survive because over 
time the partners come to know each other’s good and bad characteristics, to 
appreciate the good and to tolerate the bad and to decide—consciously or 
unconsciously—that staying together is better than the available alternatives. 
 
† Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School. 
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As a nation, the United States has been married to class actions for a quite 
long time: depending on one’s definition of the procedure, since the early 
years of the Republic,1 the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,2 or the 1966 amendment of Rule 23, the adoption of which this 
conference celebrates. But the liaison has always been uneasy, for the notion 
of resolving individual rights and property claims through a representative 
action on behalf of absent parties has always raised due process concerns.3 
The joining of group litigation with a legal regime based on individual 
autonomy was long considered mainly a marriage of convenience, justified by 
the inefficiency of resolving large numbers of claims arising out of the same 
facts and law in individual proceedings.4 And like other marriages in which 
the partners seem ill-suited, the amended Rule 23 evoked sharp concern 
among many contemporary onlookers, who foresaw dire consequences.5 
 
1 The roots of modern Rule 23 in the federal court system trace back to Equity Rule 38 adopted 
in 1912 and its predecessor Equity Rule 48 adopted in 1833. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987). The notion of 
group representation embodied in these rules of equity can in turn be traced back to the English 
Bill of Peace and before that to medieval group litigation in England. Id. 
2 On the history of the 1938 version of Rule 23, see Robert Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: 
Toward a More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1100-02 (2013); see also 
Daniel Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former Federal Equity 
Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 170 (1939). 
3 Because of such concerns the outcomes of representative group actions brought under federal 
Equity Rule 48 were not initially binding on absent parties. In Smith v. Swormstedt, the Supreme 
Court explained that the rule permitting representative group actions could bind absent parties as 
their commonality of interests would minimize the risk of unfairness: 
Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and liabilities 
are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or otherwise, that it would not be 
possible, without very great inconvenience, to make all of them parties, and would 
oftentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For convenience, 
therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of 
the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them 
the same as if all were before the court. The legal and equitable rights and liabilities 
of all being before the court by representation, and especially where the 
subject-matter of the suit is common to all, there can be very little danger but that 
the interest of all will be properly protected and maintained. 
57 U.S. 288, 303 (1853). 
Today, “commonality” remains a touchstone for assessing the appropriateness of class 
certification. See, e.g., Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (vacating class certification on the 
grounds that the class could not satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement). 
4 But see Bone, supra note 2, at 1100 (arguing that the structure of the new Rule 23 was puzzlingly 
formalistic given that the motivation for introducing the new rules of civil procedure in 1938 was to 
create a more efficient scheme for managing civil litigation). 
5 See, e.g., Eleanore Carruth, The “Legal Explosion” Has Left Business Shell-Shocked, FORTUNE, Apr. 
1973, at 65 (quoting New York University law professor Joseph Weiner as stating that “Corporations in 
the early Thirties may have felt that they were living through the French and Russian revolutions 
combined, but that wasn’t a patch to what is going on now.”); see also id. (reporting that William May, 
CEO of American Can Company, declared, “We are fighting for our lives.”). 
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As time passed and fracture lines in the marriage of class actions to 
traditional dispute resolution became apparent, there were efforts to repair 
Rule 23 in a dramatic fashion by eliminating (b)(3) damage class actions 
entirely or eliminating the rule’s tri-partite structure, 6 or less ambitiously, by 
adopting incrementally modest changes to the existing provisions.7 In time 
Congress got into the act, passing the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995,8 intended to rein in securities class actions, and the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 20059 ten years later, intended to subject class certification to 
heightened judicial scrutiny, by facilitating removal of state-law based class 
actions to federal court. At the time of this writing, Congress is poised to act 
again. H.R. 985, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017,10 
introduced in the House in February 2017 and passed a month later with little 
debate, is plainly aimed at making it increasingly difficult to certify money 
damage class actions on the grounds that they are abusive.11 
As in many acrimonious marriages, over time there has been considerable 
airing of dirty linen, which has taken the form of charges of “abuse.”12 Like 
 
6 H.R. 5103, 96th Cong. (1979), endorsed by the Carter Administration, would have substituted 
a new statutory consumer class action resembling a qui tam suit for Rule 23(b)(3). The proposal to 
change the structure of Rule 23, circulated in the early 1990s by Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
Chair Judge Sam Pointer, was intended to facilitate class actions, especially mass tort class actions. 
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 25-26 (2000) [hereinafter HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS]. 
7 A multiyear discussion of amending Rule 23 that began in the mid-1990s had by the end of 
the decade produced only one amendment, Rule 23(f), permitting interlocutory appeals of 
certification decisions. Id. at 26-37. However, more significant amendments, including the addition 
of Rule 23(g) on the appointment of class counsel and Rule 23(h) on the award of class counsel’s 
fees, became effective in 2003. As discussed at this Symposium, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 
is again considering amendments to Rule 23. 
8 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
9 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 118 Stat. 4 (2005). 
10 Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency 
Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017). The House adopted H.R. 985 on March 9, 2017 and sent 
it on to the Senate for consideration. 
11 On the purposes of the proposed statute, see Congress Taking Up Tort Reform 
with H.R. 985, FRIENDS OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (March 6, 2017), 
https://www.friendsoftheuschamber.com/don_t_let_the_trial_lawyers_win_tell_congress_to_act 
[https://perma.cc/M7QU-S999]; see also H.R.985 - Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering 
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/985/text [https://perma.cc/PCC8-LKC4] (describing the proposed statute in full). 
12 See id.; see also Lawrence Schonbrun, The Class Action Racket, AM. THINKER (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2013/04/the_class_action_racket.html 
[https://perma.cc/3RAJ-B9LY]; Paul Atkins, The Supreme Court ’s  Opportuni ty  to  End 
Abus ive  Clas s  Action Securities Lawsuits, FORBES, (Mar. 4, 2014, 3:57 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/04/the-supreme-courts-opportunity-to-end-abusive-
securities-class-action-lawsuits/#53cf2e11690a [https://perma.cc/KF37-HGQ5]; James Burling, 
The End of Abusive Class-Action Lawsuits? Or the End of Industry?, PAC. LEGAL FOUND.: LIBERTY 
BLOG, (Dec. 30, 2013) http://blog.pacificlegal.org/the-end-of-abusive-class-action-lawsuits-or-the-
end-of-industry/ [https://perma.cc/D9PD-9VU9]; Trent Norris & James Speyer, Culling the Herd of 
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the partners in longlasting acrimonious marriages, the critics and supporters 
of Rule 23 have trotted out the same charges and countercharges over and 
over again. Recently, even the neighbors have weighed in, with advocates of 
adopting class actions outside the United States explaining that while they 
believe collective litigation could play a beneficial role in their respective 
jurisdictions, they are not promoting what they perceive as dysfunctional 
“American-style class actions.”13 
Notwithstanding the vigorous policy debate over the benefits and costs of 
class actions and the substantial jurisprudence that has developed in response, 
there has been no comprehensive sustained empirical effort to monitor the 
consequences of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. Astonishingly, although 
critics often point rhetorically to a “flood of frivolous litigation” as a reason 
for curbing class actions, fifty years after the adoption of the 1966 
amendments no one knows how many class action complaints are filed 
annually in the United States,14 much less what sorts of substantive legal 
claims are most likely to give rise to class actions, what their modes of 
disposition are or what their outcomes are. Through the diligent efforts of 
researchers at the Federal Judicial Center,15 and scholars such as Eisenberg 
 
Abusive Class Action Litigation, SELLER BEWARE (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/06/culling-the-herd-of-abusive-class-action-
litigation.html [https://perma.cc/5Y7V-AJ7P]. 
13 For a discussion of European attitudes towards class actions, see Deborah Hensler, From Sea 
to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965 (2017), and 
Deborah Hensler & Stefaan Voet, Class Actions Across the Atlantic: From Guarded Interest to 
European Policy (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
14 In the mid-1990s the Federal Judicial Center reviewed docket information for a random 
sample of 8320 civil cases filed in the federal courts from 1987–1990. The Federal Judicial Center 
researchers found that only seventy-one percent of cases in which class action activity was recorded 
in docket information were flagged as class actions in the AO’s Integrated Statistical Database that 
provides the basis for the AO’s annual statistical reports on the business of the federal courts. 
The Federal Judicial Center concluded “there are no reliable national data on class action activity in 
the federal courts.” Memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from Thomas 
Willging, Laural Hooper and Robert Niemic (Feb. 9, 1995), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/prelim_class.pdf/$file/prelim_class.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UNQ9-RDBC] [hereinafter Memorandum to Advisory Committee]. 
15 See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule23_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3CV-LGKR] [hereinafter EMPIRICAL STUDY FINAL REPORT] (assisting in the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ then ongoing review of proposed amendments to Rule 23); 
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM 
PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS (2008), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/preliminary_findings_from_phase_two_class_
action_fairness_study_2008_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC8E-SGLT] (assessing, at the request of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, the impact of CAFA on federal court workload). 
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and Miller,16 Fitzpatrick,17 and Baker, Perino and Silver,18 we have learned 
about characteristics of federal class actions at certain points of time; short-
term consequences of certain rule changes; key features of Rule 23 (b)(3) 
settlements approved by federal judges; and trends in filings and outcomes of 
specific case types. However, judicial and legislative reformers have little 
empirical evidence to support assertions that general rule changes are necessary 
and only speculation to guide consideration of what the consequences of these 
changes might be. A good therapist might advise that it is way past time to 
uncover the facts related to the stresses in our marriage to Rule 23. 
In this Article, I propose a research agenda for systematically investigating 
the frequency and key characteristics of class action litigation, and assessing 
how well Rule 23 meets the goals its proponents have long held out for it: 
efficient management of mass claims, efficient and fair compensation of losses 
due to defendants’ negligence or statutory and regulatory violations, and 
optimal deterrence of illegal behavior. My intention is to begin a conversation 
about such an agenda, not to set the agenda myself. Parts I–IV identify the 
types of data we should be collecting and reporting and discuss the challenges 
different types of data collection present.19 Part V considers the primary 
barriers to embarking on sustained systematic empirical research on class 
actions.20 This Article concludes by challenging the federal judiciary to 
promote empirical analysis of the consequences of Rule 23. 
 
 
16 Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action 
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 248 (2010) (detailing settlements in class 
action and shareholder derivative cases in federal courts from 1993–2008). 
17 Brian Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 811 (2010) (describing federal class action settlements identified in 
a comprehensive study). 
18 See Lynn Baker et al., Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment, 
66 VAND. L. REV. 1677, 1691 (2013) [hereinafter Baker et al., Attorneys’ Fees] (analyzing fee awards 
based on a systematic investigation of federal securities class actions); see also Lynn Baker et al., Is the 
Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 
(2015) [hereinafter Baker et al., Is the Price Right?] (discussing factors influencing attorney fee awards 
from the years 2007 through 2012). 
19 There is a voluminous literature on Rule 23 class actions. Although much of the literature is 
limited to doctrinal and normative analysis, a significant fraction of publications cite empirical data. 
Reviewing and synthesizing the empirical evidence presented in scholarly and public policy 
literature is beyond the scope of this Article. 
20 My discussion focuses on federal class actions. The problems of collecting data regarding 
state class actions are even more daunting than those described in Part V. A serious program of 
ongoing research on federal Rule 23 could provide a model for research on state class actions. 
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I. TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE BEAST 
More than three decades onwards from Professor Arthur Miller’s attempt 
to demolish the dueling depictions of Rule 23 class actions as “Frankenstein 
monsters” and “shining knights,”21 we still do not have sufficient data to know 
what the 1966 revision of Rule 23 effected. As I discuss further, assessing the 
character of class actions—are they monsters or knights?—presents 
challenging empirical problems. But the monster appellation connotes 
something large and out of control, which in turn suggests that the sheer 
number of class action filings should disturb us, regardless of their character. 
It seems odd, therefore, that we have gone so long without knowing how 
many class action filings there are.22 
Sound policy analysis begins with measurement of the phenomenon of 
interest. That measurement may take many forms, but usually the first step 
is to determine the magnitude and shape of the target. Numbers do not tell 
us everything we ought to know about class actions (or other phenomena of 
policy concern), but they do help us to determine what is worth arguing 
about. Moreover, many charges about the negative consequences of class 
actions, such as the assertion that the risks of class actions are so great that 
they force defendants to settle non-meritorious claims—so called “blackmail 
settlements”—rest on empirical assumptions about the pattern of disposition 
of class complaints, which have also gone largely untested. 
Many lawsuits filed in the form of class actions are dropped, dismissed or 
otherwise resolved without class certification. Over time, judges, lawyers and 
parties have come to refer to these lawsuits as “putative class actions.” These 
lawsuits, signaled by the filing of a class complaint, constitute the research population 
 
21 Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action 
Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979). 
22 Federal court caseload statistics have been sporadically reported since 1801, when President 
Thomas Jefferson asked Secretary of State James Madison to send a report of federal court business 
to the U. S. Congress. See History of Federal Caseload Reporting, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_historical_overview 
[https://perma.cc/FJ9B-3W3P]. Over the next 70 years, Congress periodically requested selective 
statistics, apparently in an effort to inform specific policy debates. Id. The 1870 Act establishing the 
Department of Justice ordered the U.S. Attorney General to submit annual reports on the business 
of the federal courts to Congress. Id. The initial reports focused exclusively on cases involving the 
U.S. as a party but in 1873 Congress amended the reporting mandate to include private litigation. 
Id. A modern system of statistical reporting was established in the 1930s and periodically revised in 
subsequent years in response to recommendations from various special commissions and advisory 
groups. Id. The current reporting system, now relying on electronic case filing, dates back to the late 
1990s. Id. For an early discussion of the usefulness of court statistics for decisionmaking, see Will 
Shafroth, Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 200 (1948). For discussion of 
empirical legal studies in the first half of the twentieth century, see Herbert Kritzer, Empirical Legal 
Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925, 925 (2009). 
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of interest. At a minimum, policymakers concerned about class actions ought 
to know: 
 
1. The number of class complaints filed annually, by case type (e.g. 
securities, anti-trust, consumer fraud, product liability), party 
characteristics, venue and category of certification (i.e. (b)(1)(a), (b)(1)(b), 
(b)(2), or (b)(3)). 
 
2. The mode of disposition of these complaints, whether dropped, 
dismissed, decided by summary judgment, tried to verdict or settled.23 
 
3. Time to disposition.24 
 
4. Whether or not these complaints were ever certified as class actions, 
either for all purposes or for settlement only. 
 
5. Whether certification occurred prior to or following judicial decision 
on pre-trial dispositive motions. 
 
6. Whether there were Daubert or other evidentiary hearings on 
certification. 
 
7. Whether the complaint was resolved as part of a multi-district 
litigation (MDL).25 
 
23 Federal court management statistics currently indicate whether cases were terminated before 
pretrial; during pretrial; or during or after trial. See, e.g., Federal Court Management Statistics, 
December 2016, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-court-management-statistics-december-2016 [https://perma.cc/H49Q-5KQ9]. 
24 Median time to disposition is currently reported for civil cases, by district and case 
type. See, e.g., id. 
25 According to John Rabiej of the Duke Law School Center for Judicial Studies: 
In 2014, there [were] 117,647 non-asbestos cases in MDLs representing 36% of the 
total U.S. pending civil caseload. Excluding prisoner and social security actions 
from the U.S. pending civil caseload, which typically (though not always) take little 
time of article III judges, the 117,647 non-asbestos cases in MDLs represent about 
45% of the U.S. totals. 
E-mail from John Rabiej, Dir. of the Ctr. for Judicial Studies, Duke Law School, to author (Aug. 
29, 2014) (on file with author). Some MDLs include substantial numbers of class actions. The 
propensity of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to grant MDL status has varied over 
time, which may complicate efforts to count class actions. See Deborah Hensler, The Role of Multi-
Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 885-86 
(2001) (observing that “mass torts arose in the U.S. in an era when courts generally declined to 
certify personal injury class actions”); Hon. John Heyburn & Francis McGovern, 
Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, LITIGATION, Spring 2012, at 30 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5335&context=faculty_scholarship 
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8. Whether there was appellate litigation related to the certification 
decision and the outcome of this litigation. 
 
9. Whether the final outcome of the complaint at the district court level 
was appealed and the outcome of the appeal. 
 
Data on filings and mode of disposition ought to be reported in the same 
form as data on filings and mode of disposition of all civil filings so as to 
permit calculations of the fraction of claims within case type categories that 
generate class claims and class-wide resolutions and comparison of 
disposition patterns between ordinary and class litigation. 
Compiling and reporting annual data would permit empirically-based 
analyses of trends, including analysis of the consequences of doctrinal and 
legislative changes and rule amendments.26 For example, reporting the 
number of class complaints filed annually, by case type and venue, would 
contribute to an objective assessment of political charges that the federal 
courts generally or some federal districts in particular are overrun with class 
actions.27 Reporting the pattern of dispositions by mode of disposition and 
the timing of different events would contribute to an objective assessment of 
political charges that the “in terrorem” effect of Rule 23 leads to many 
“blackmail settlements.”28 From both normative and practical perspectives, it 
 
[https://perma.cc/6SFM-QTCA] (“For many years, the panel regularly granted more than 75 
percent of all 1407 motions. During the last two years, that percentage has dropped to about 55 
percent.”); Amanda Bronstad, Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Increasing Denials Reflect Heightened 
Scrutiny, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 2016 (showing a trend of increasing denials from 2006 through 2015). 
26 Merely measuring trends is not sufficient for analyzing the consequences of doctrinal (or 
other) changes. See Jonah Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly 
and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2295 (2012) (analyzing the effects of changes in 
pleading standards); David Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (2013) (highlighting the challenges of assessing the consequences of 
procedural change). However, trend data provide a first indication of what is changing. 
27 See, e.g., Federal Courts in Two Top Hellholes Issue Refreshingly Reasonable Class-Action Decisions, 
JUDICIALHELLHOLES.ORG (July 19, 2016), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2016/07/19/federal-
courts-in-two-top-hellholes-issue-refreshingly-reasonable-class-action-decisions 
[https://perma.cc/9M2N-U7SX] (reporting two court decisions in which federal judges reduced 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, rejected several class claims, and “decided that a class action may be 
decertified after a jury returns a verdict but before the court enters a final judgment.”). The 
“hellhole” designation has been awarded both to districts that are claimed to certify an unusual 
number of class actions and districts whose judges are claimed to certify non-meritorious class 
actions and approve unreasonable settlements. See CONGRESS WATCH, PUB. CITIZEN, CLASS 
ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING, (2005),  
https://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7NU-M2J8]. The 
“hellhole” project, begun in the 2000s and sponsored by the American Tort Reform Association, 
focuses primarily on state court litigation, including class actions. Id. Its reports were used 
successfully in lobbying Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005. Id. 
28 The Supreme Court has referred to this allegation in several recent decisions, apparently 
accepting its veracity. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200 
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would be useful to know if the Supreme Court’s recent decisions raising the 
bar for certification29 are leading to evidentiary hearings that increasingly 
resemble mini-trials on the merits, as some practitioners have charged. In 
sum, systematically collected and objectively reported data could short-circuit 
certain arguments about the consequences of class actions and class action 
doctrine, while bringing into sharper focus those issues that empirical data 
indicate are truly worth fighting over. 
II. MEASURING EFFICIENCY 
Case law, commentary and the language of the rule itself have long 
recognized that efficient judicial management of a multiplicity of claims 
arising from the same factual circumstances is a goal of Rule 23.30 Yet there is 
little empirical data relating to the workload class actions impose on courts. 
This may be because the efficiency gains of resolving hundreds or thousands 
of claims using an aggregative procedure—a consolidated non-class 
proceeding such as an MDL, a Rule 42 consolidation in a single court, or a 
class action—is so obviously more efficient than resolving each such claim 
individually with a full panoply of procedural rights.31 Determining the 
 
(2013) (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742, 757 (U.S. 2011)). If—as 
fragmentary data suggest—a large fraction of class actions is certified after the strength of claims has 
been tested through pre-trial motion and discovery practice and plaintiffs have prevailed on these 
preliminary matters, it seems more likely that defendants have concluded that class-wide settlement 
is preferable to proceeding to trial on an individual or class basis, than that they have been terrified 
into submission. See generally Deborah Hensler, Can Private Class Actions Enforce Regulations? Do 
They? Should They? (highlighting class action certification timing), in COMPARATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS (Francesca Bignami & 
David Zaring eds., 2016). 
29 Decisions interpreting Rule 23 in a more restrictive fashion than previous holdings or 
otherwise restricting plaintiffs’ ability to proceed in a class form include Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (vacating certification of a class of female employees, applying a 
heightened commonality standard) and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013) 
(vacating certification of an anti-trust class, on the grounds that the damage model did not fit the 
class definition). 
30 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1973) (“A contrary rule allowing 
participation only by those potential members of the class who had earlier filed motions to intervene 
in the suit would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a 
principal purpose of the procedure.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“A class action may be maintained 
if . . . . the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class 
Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 421 (2014) (“A 
third rationale in support of the class action rule posits that class action procedures enhance judicial 
efficiency and economy, which is largely a utilitarian justification for the rule.”). Mullenix sought to 
debunk this and other “romantic” notions of the value of Rule 23 class actions. Id. 
31 As Mullenix and others have argued, aggregation’s most significant consequence for judicial 
workload may be in facilitating litigation that would otherwise not occur. Mullenix, supra note 30, 
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relative efficiency of different forms of aggregation would be difficult because, 
in practice, large-scale litigation is often addressed with multiple procedural 
tools at the same time. For example, a single MDL may include a mix of many 
class actions and multiple individual lawsuits,32 and may result in a class wide 
resolution under Rule 23 or a non-class “global settlement” reached with 
attorneys representing large numbers of individual plaintiffs.33 Moreover, 
large-scale litigation is not assigned to different aggregative procedures on a 
random basis, meaning that the effects of different aggregative approaches on 
court burden would be confounded with differences in the cases themselves, 
including substantive law, facts, party characteristics, as well as differences in 
attorney strategies and judicial management preferences. 
Notwithstanding these limitations on interpreting workload statistics for 
class actions there are times when consulting such data might help in 
weighing policy decisions. For example, when Congress was considering 
adopting the Class Action Fairness Act, the Judicial Conference worried 
about the effects on workload of shifting an unknown number of state court 
class actions to the federal court.34 The standard approach to measuring 
judicial workload in state and federal courts relies on weighted case filings—
i.e. the numbers of different types of cases pending multiplied by an agreed-
upon measure of judicial effort per case type. According to the Federal 
Judicial Center, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) began 
using weighted case filings to calculate judicial workloads in 1971.35 The AO’s 
 
at 422. Whether that should be regarded as a positive or negative consequence is a question that 
requires both empirical and normative analysis. 
32 The recent Volkswagen MDL, for example, is reported to have consolidated 180 putative 
class actions and about 300 individual lawsuits. In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” MDL, U.S. DIST. CT. 
FOR THE N. DIST. OF CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl [https://perma.cc/2HW4-
8CHA] [hereinafter Volkswagen MDL]. 
33 The 9/11 recovery workers’ personal injury litigation managed by Judge Alvin Hellerstein is 
an example of this. See Allen Hellerstein, James Henderson & Aaron Twerski, Managerial Judging: 
The 9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012). Judge Hellerstein chose not to 
rule on the Rule 23 motion filed in that litigation apparently in the belief that this would facilitate a 
global settlement. See id. at 168 (“The court had empowered the parties to reach a global settlement 
and had positioned itself to act as an impartial guarantor of the fairness of any settlement that the 
parties might reach.”). 
34 EMERY LEE III & THOMAS WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS 
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE 
TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 1 (2008) (reporting preliminary 
findings measuring CAFA’s impact on litigation activity and judicial rulings as well as case 
characteristics of class actions in the two years preceding CAFA’s effective date). 
35 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., History of Federal Caseload Reporting, supra note 22, at 4. Until the early 
2000s, weights were calculated based on judges filling out time sheets (sometimes termed “diaries”). 
PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT 
CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 23 (2005) [hereinafter CASE-WEIGHTING FINAL REPORT]. In 2004, after 
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annual court management statistics currently include the number of weighted 
case filings per judgeship but do not provide data that would permit us to 
compare class to non-class (or other aggregated) cases, although the case 
weights do take into account class action-specific events, such as judicial 
hearings on class certification.36 In a national judicial time study of 8320 civil 
cases filed from 1987–1990, the Federal Judicial Center found that putative 
class actions consumed “almost five times more judicial time than the typical 
civil case.”37 But this finding was based on only fifty-one class actions (the 
only class actions identified in the sample). Moreover, comparing judicial 
burden for class actions to the “typical” civil case—rather than to the typical 
complex non-class case—may not provide an accurate measure of the 
additional judicial burden imposed by class action lawsuits, compared to 
comparable non-class lawsuits. In any event, there has been no similar study 
conducted since. 
A different measure of efficiency focuses on party and attorney effort to 
resolve litigation. This is difficult to measure, but legal costs and expenses, 
relative to the monetary and non-monetary stakes of the litigation, are a good 
proxy. Recent empirical research on fee awards to class counsel38 provides 
clues as to the costs on the plaintiff side but because fees are frequently 
 
deliberation with representatives of the judiciary and extensive research and analysis by Federal 
Judicial Center staff, the Judicial Conference adopted a new approach to calculating weights, based 
on event analysis. Id. at 1-2. In brief, the method involved collecting docket data on the frequency 
distribution of different types of case events—e.g. hearings—by case type and estimating models of 
average judicial effort per case using these data. Id. This approach relieved judges of the burden of 
filling out time sheets and arguably took greater account of the differences in the ways judges handle 
different types of cases. Id. An attractive feature of this approach is said to be that it is easy to adjust 
weights over time to reflect differences in judicial case management strategies. Id. (comparing the 
different strategies). The case weights were updated in 2016, based on new research by the Federal 
Judicial Center. E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Jud. Ctr., to Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law Sch. 
(Oct. 5, 2016) (on file with author). However, the most recent research did not ask judges to 
complete time sheets; rather, several hundred judges were surveyed and asked to estimate their time 
associated with different case types. Id. 
36 CASE-WEIGHTING FINAL REPORT, supra note 35, in appendices. 
37 EMPIRICAL STUDY FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 7. The judicial time study was based 
on judges completing “diaries” recording time spent on individual cases. Id. at 7-8. 
38 Eisenberg, Miller, and Fitzpatrick analyze settlement and fee award data for the universe of 
federal class action settlements. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 16; Fitzpatrick, supra note 17. Baker, 
Perino & Silver analyze data for securities class actions. Baker et al., Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 18. 
Eisenberg, Miller, and Fitzpatrick relied on judicial decisions approving class action settlements and 
deciding fee awards. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 16; Fitzpatrick, supra note 17. Baker, Perino and 
Silver’s analysis is based instead on an extensive docket search for all securities class actions that 
were certified and settled from 2007–2012 that were included in the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse database, which is widely regarded as the most comprehensive database on securities 
class actions available. Baker et al., Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 18. In addition to providing important 
new information on the fee award process in securities class actions their research demonstrates the 
value of analyses based on federal court electronic dockets. 
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awarded on a percent of fund basis, that amount may be more or less than the 
value of the actual attorney time invested in the litigation. Moreover, at least 
in securities class actions, there is empirical evidence to suggest that fee 
awards are affected not only by the size of the settlement fund but by other 
factors including the characteristics of lead plaintiffs, the volume of class 
action litigation in the district where the lawsuit is resolved, and the 
managing judge’s experience with class actions. Baker, Perino and Silver 
interpret these data as indicating that experienced class action lawyers “game” 
the fee award system,39 which suggests that fee awards are a biased measure 
of actual costs. Although virtually all motions for fee awards in securities class 
actions include hour and fee data either to support requests for “lodestar” 
awards or to serve as a “cross-check” on percentage-of-fund awards,40 Baker, 
Perino and Silver’s analyses suggest that class counsel manipulate these data,41 
meaning that they also cannot be relied upon as a proxy for true expenses. 
Importantly, empirical research on class counsel fees to date excludes 
expenses associated with the substantial fraction of putative class actions that 
do not reach settlement but do create expenses for plaintiff class counsel. 
Moreover, there are no publicly available data for defendants’ costs to defend 
class actions.42 In sum, when it comes to measuring the efficiency of class 
actions from the private perspective we are largely in the dark. 
Not usually included in attorney fees and expenses, but important 
components of transaction costs in class action litigation, are the costs of notice 
(which often amount to one million dollars or more) and the costs of claims 
administration. These costs are reported to judges at the close of class actions, 
along with a report of compensation paid to class members. The ratio of these 
costs to compensation delivered is another measure of efficiency. Moreover, 
these costs should be included when calculating the sanctions imposed on 
defendants for the purpose of assessing the deterrence potential of class actions. 
The financial reports submitted to the judge should be made available to 
researchers for this purpose after the termination of class action lawsuits. 
 
39 Baker et al., Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 18, at 1396 (reporting that in securities class action 
cases attorneys ask for a higher percentage of funds from judges in districts with lower volumes of 
securities class actions and from individual judges with less experience managing class actions). 
40 Id. at 1417. 
41 Id. at 1418. 
42 Hensler et al. discuss the results of their attempt to obtain data on defendants’ legal expenses 
for a small number of consumer and mass tort class actions. In three class actions where defendants 
were willing to provide these data, their expenses ranged from twenty percent of the amount 
awarded to plaintiff class counsel to an amount equal to the plaintiff class counsel award. 
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 6, at 441-42. 
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III. MEASURING COMPENSATION PERFORMANCE 
American scholars have argued that deterrence is the only sensible 
purpose for class actions when class members’ claims are small43 and perhaps 
the most important purpose even when claims are large.44 However, the belief 
that compensation of losses large and small is an important function of class 
actions lives on in American discourse about class actions,45 in the wording of 
Rule 23,46 in district court decisions approving or rejecting proposed 
settlements, in appellate decisions reversing judicial approval of class action 
settlements, and in public debate over the failures of Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions.47 Notwithstanding this longstanding belief, we know little about how 
 
43 See, e.g., Brian Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Attorneys Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2047 (2011) (arguing that small-stakes class actions serve no compensation function but rather 
only deterrence); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: 
The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) (indicating that the 
main purpose of these claims is deterrence). 
44 See generally David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort 
Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) (discussing deterrence claims generally and 
concluding that mandatory collectivization is necessary to optimize deterrence); David Rosenberg, 
Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 
(1996) (concluding that deterrence is the strongest, if not only justification for these large tort law 
claims). 
45 See Mullenix, supra note 30, at 409 (identifying the compensatory function of class actions 
as a component of the “romantic narrative” about Rule 23). 
46 The Rule states: 
If the (settlement) proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only 
after a hearing and on finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Although the 
“fair, reasonable and adequate” standard arguably could refer to deterrence, the 
Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2003 Amendments to Rule 23(e) makes clear that 
the reference is to the procedure’s compensatory function. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
47 For example, criticism of “coupon settlements” is grounded in part on the perception that 
they offer no monetary benefit to class members. See generally J. Brendan Day, My Lawyer Went to 
Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act’s Inadequate Provision of 
Judicial Scrutiny Over Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1085 (2008). Critics view 
low “take-up rates” (the fraction of class members who come forward to claim the benefits for which 
they are eligible) as demonstrating that class actions do not accomplish their alleged compensation 
function. See, e.g., id.; Robert Klonoff & Mark Hermann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-
Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2005–2006). Some critics view 
substituting cy pres remedies for monetary compensation to class members as an admission that the 
class action procedure is an ineffective compensation mechanism. See generally Martin Redish et al., 
Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 618 (2010).  
In civil law jurisdictions, where private enforcement litigation is seen as illegitimate in most 
instances, “collective redress” is seen as the only appropriate purpose of class actions. 
Recommendation 2013/396, 2013 O.J. (L 206) 60 (EU), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32013H0396:EN:NOT 
[https://perma.cc/2Q8V-F664] [hereinafter European Commission Principles on Collective 
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well Rule 23(b)(3) compensates class members—how “fair, reasonable and 
adequate” settlements actually are—much less how compensation varies 
across different types of cases or (importantly) different degrees of judicial 
scrutiny of proposed settlements. We also do not know how different 
approaches to claims administration affect the delivery of compensation to 
eligible claimants. The lack of objective information on Rule 23’s 
compensation performance function fuels debate over the value of class 
actions and creates significant opportunities for misleading characterizations 
of class action outcomes. 
Measuring performance of any compensation scheme is challenging. It 
requires data on the proportion of eligible beneficiaries who claimed; the 
magnitude of claimants’ and non-claimants’ losses; and the amount of 
monetary benefits paid to claimants. Often the claiming rate and the 
magnitude of non-claimants’ losses are unknown, although perhaps possible 
to estimate. Claimants’ reported losses may be inaccurate if they do not 
properly understand reporting rules, find them too difficult to comply with, 
or if they negligently or deliberately exaggerate their losses. In most 
instances, the aggregate amount of compensation actually paid out is easiest 
to determine. Aggregate data alone, however, are not sufficient to assess 
compensation performance: a fair compensation scheme will deliver the same 
ratio of compensation to loss to similarly situated beneficiaries. Individual-
level data are necessary to examine distributional fairness.48 
Measuring the compensation performance of class actions presents 
additional challenges. At the time a class complaint is filed the size of the 
class (eligible class members) is often not known and their losses are difficult 
to estimate. Moreover, as a result of applicable substantive law, putative class 
members’ compensable losses may be different from their actual losses.49 By 
the time a class settlement is negotiated attorneys possess enough 
information about the scale of the class and the magnitude of class members’ 
 
Redress]; see also Deborah Hensler & Stefaan Voet, Class Actions Across the Atlantic: From 
Guarded Interest to European Policy (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
48 Procedural fairness ought also to be a concern in assessing compensation schemes. Here I 
focus only on performance with regard to outcomes. For a discussion of the challenges of designing 
compensation systems, see KENNETH FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION 
AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL (2012) (describing the challenges of designing the 
9/11 and other mass compensation programs); Deborah Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-
Induced Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2005) (noting twelve key decisions 
that the designers of any compensation program face); Byron Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as 
Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 
30 MISS. C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2011) (advising on how to best utilize and enhance the functioning of 
the quasi-public claims fund). 
49 See Baker et al., Is the Price Right?, supra note 18, at 1438 (observing that “at the onset of a 
litigation lawyers cannot predict settlement size with any degree of precision.”). 
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losses to agree on an amount defendants will pay to resolve the litigation, the 
eligibility rules that will determine who can claim compensation, and average 
compensation for different types of claimants. Often, however, a good deal 
of uncertainty remains not just at the time of negotiations but at the time a 
judge certifies a Rule 23(b)(3) class and approves the settlement. As a result, 
approved settlements—which have provided most of our information on class 
action settlements to date50—offer an incomplete picture of the average 
compensation promised to class members, and virtually no information on 
distributional fairness.51 Because claiming rates vary dramatically and can be 
vanishingly small, how much compensation was actually delivered, to what 
proportion of eligible class members, and how it was distributed among class 
members only become apparent after settlement distribution. This 
information is contained in financial reports by the claims administrators who 
typically manage the post-settlement claims process, which are usually 
submitted to judges when class action litigation is finally closed (and 
sometimes on a more frequent basis for protracted litigation). This is another 
reason these reports should be made available for research purposes after the 
termination of class action lawsuits. 
Extensive docket analysis of putative class actions, of the type pioneered 
in Baker, Perino and Silver’s fee studies,52 could provide a better (although 
imperfect) measure of the denominator (i.e. losses) for calculating 
compensation rates. As I discuss later, such analysis is currently hobbled by 
restrictions on high-volume requests from court electronic dockets (e.g. 
PACER files). Determining actual compensation requires access to the final 
financial reports of the claims administrators. To date, courts have proved 
unwilling to provide access to these reports or the data contained therein.53 
 
50 See, e.g., Memorandum to Advisory Committee, supra note 14; Eisenberg & Miller, supra 
note 16; Fitzpatrick, supra note 17. In the late 1990s study of class actions that I led, which included 
an intensive analysis of documents and interviews with attorneys in ten certified class actions, we 
found substantial differences between the approved settlement amounts and actual compensation 
paid to class members. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 6, at 458-59. 
51 Cy pres remedies and injunctive relief are not strictly speaking components of compensation 
but, as I discuss later, need to be taken into account when assessing the deterrent potential of class 
actions. 
52 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
53 See generally William Rubenstein & Nicholas Pace, Shedding Light on Outcomes of Class Actions, 
in CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Joseph Doherty 
et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting the futility of the task). Analysis of post-settlement claims 
administrator data would also facilitate understanding of how claims administration design affects 
claiming rates. See Deborah Hensler, Reflections on Settlement Class Actions: Paper Prepared for 
the George Washington University Roundtable (Apr. 8, 2015) (unpublished paper) (on file with 
author). Kevin Clermont, Brian Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Lehav, Geoffrey Miller, Nicholas Pace, 
William Rubenstein, Charles Silver, Bryan Wolfman and I have submitted a formal proposal for a 
new Rule 23(i) on “Class Action Disbursement Disclosure,” to the Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules that is currently considering Rule 23 amendments. To the best of my knowledge, the 
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IV. MEASURING DETERRENCE EFFECTIVENESS 
Assessing how well class actions meet their (often contested) deterrence 
goal is most difficult of all.54 To properly assess Rule 23’s contribution to 
enforcement—its “private attorney general” role—requires information on 
the rate and nature of legal violations that are justiciable through class actions, 
the proportion of these that are identified by putative class members or their 
representatives, and the sanctions that are imposed directly and indirectly on 
defendants as a result of class actions. Direct sanctions are defined as all costs 
imposed on defendants, including total compensation paid to class members, 
cy pres remedies, and the cost of injunctive relief and all transaction costs, 
including legal expenses and the costs of notice and claims administration. 
Indirect sanctions include reputational capital losses, as reflected in loss of 
market share and diminished share value, inter alia. Moreover, for purposes 
of assessing whether Rule 23 is an effective deterrence mechanism, it is 
important to know the accuracy of identification of legal violations—that is, 
the rate of false positives to false negatives. False negatives may be impossible 
to discern. False positives, however, may be reflected in the determination of 
the merits of putative class actions. Although the definition of a meritorious 
class action often depends on who is making the determination55, how a case 
was resolved—whether by dismissal, summary judgment, or trial verdict—
sheds some light on the issue.56 
In addition, if criminal prosecution or public enforcement actions are 
available, data on public actions related to the same violations are necessary, 
as optimal deterrence should take into account all costs imposed on the 
wrongdoer, lest the combined outcome of private and public actions result in 
over-deterrence. Systematically investigating the relationships among private 
and public enforcement requires linking litigation data to regulatory agency 
data. Currently this is difficult to do on a broad scale but as we move further 
into a “big data” universe it should become less difficult, unless specific 
barriers are imposed to prevent such linkage.57 Until then, case studies relying 
 
Committee has taken no action on our proposal. However, §1719 of the newly proposed Fairness in 
Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 calls for the collection and transmission of information on class 
action disbursements to the Federal Judicial Center. Fairness in Class Action Litigation and 
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. §1719 (2017). 
54 Reviewing the vast theoretical literature on the difficulty of measuring litigation’s 
effectiveness as a deterrent mechanism is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead I propose a 
commonsense agenda that would shed light on Rule 23’s contribution to regulatory enforcement via 
private actions, although it would not yield a conclusive answer to the question of Rule 23’s value as 
a deterrence mechanism. 
55 HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 6, at 416-24. 
56 For a discussion of inferring merit from disposition patterns, see Hensler, supra note 25. 
57 It has become increasingly common for public policymakers to prevent access to the sort of 
information necessary to link data on the grounds that doing so would violate privacy protections. 
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on small samples of lawsuits offer the most promising understanding of the 
relationships between private and public enforcement.58 
V. WHY WE DON’T KNOW MORE ABOUT  
RULE 23 CLASS ACTIONS 
Policy analysts perennially complain about the lack of sufficient objective 
data to support analyses of the consequences of important policies and 
programs. Analysts of class action policy are no exception in this regard. 
However, we are at a severe disadvantage by comparison to our colleagues in 
the fields of health, education, welfare, and national security in that we face 
a virtual absence of even the most basic information on how class actions 
operate in federal and state courts. Given the huge resources that have been 
poured into lobbying Congress on class action issues, the enthusiasm 
displayed by the Supreme Court for reinterpreting Rule 23, and the near 
continuous consideration of Rule 23 amendments by the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee over the last twenty-five years, the lack of empirical evidence 
regarding class actions is startling.59 Some of these barriers are a result of 
difficult technical challenges. Others, however, are a result of decisions by the 
Judicial Conference. In this Part I discuss five current barriers to systematic 
empirical analysis of the consequences of Rule 23. 
A. Unknowable Facts 
Some information relevant to assessing how well class actions meet their 
efficiency, compensation, and deterrence goals lies beyond the court system. 
Defendants are under no obligation to report their transaction costs. Unless 
individuals and entities harmed by legal violations understand that their 
injuries or losses were caused by illegal action, decide to claim against the 
wrongdoer, and have the knowledge, resources, and stamina to pursue their 
 
However, the names of litigating parties are a matter of public record. While regulatory agencies 
frequently decline to provide information on putative violations that they ultimately decide not to 
prosecute, basic descriptive information on cases that are criminally prosecuted or result in civil 
enforcement actions should also be made available. 
58 Hensler, supra note 25, discusses empirical studies attempting to link private and public 
enforcement data related to class actions. 
59 I am regularly asked by reporters for empirical data relevant to high-visibility class action 
lawsuits, Supreme Court decisions on class actions and regulatory agency and congressional 
decisionmaking related to class actions. I have to respond—to the astonishment of the reporters—
that neither I nor anyone else has readily available data. One Bloomberg reporter who talked with 
me frequently in the period prior to the Court issuing its decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes asked me 
how could I “keep from tearing (my) hair out.” 
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claims, we have no way of measuring compensable losses.60 We may be able 
to determine aggregate losses and total compensation paid to victims who did 
come forward; however, without knowing the losses of those who did not 
claim, we cannot calculate total losses and therefore the fraction of losses that 
was compensated as a result of class litigation. Unless public officials or 
private individuals come forward to allege legal violations we have no way of 
measuring the frequency or magnitude of such violations. Without this 
information, we can calculate neither the ratio of violations that resulted in 
sanctions (as a result of public enforcement or private litigation) to 
undetected or unpunished violations, nor the ratio of economic penalties to 
the economic value of illegal behavior that went unpunished. As a 
consequence of all these unknowns, we can never fully measure class action 
litigation’s consequences. However, with the right information, we could 
learn much more about these consequences than we know now. 
B. Lack of Reporting or Misreporting 
The AO has long reported statistics on the federal court caseload. These 
statistics aggregate data from individual case records including information 
provided by attorneys and information on case events from court records.61 
The digitized individual case records are contained in the federal Integrated 
Database.62 For civil lawsuits, plaintiff attorneys complete a “civil cover sheet” 
on which they enter party names, the basis for federal jurisdiction, the nature 
of the suit (using a very detailed set of categories), and, in a section asking 
what the complaint requests, whether “THIS IS A CLASS ACTION 
UNDER RULE 23.”63 This class action indicator is one of the variables 
included in the federal Integrated Database, and has long been the basis for 
the AO’s reports on federal class action litigation. Statistics on the frequency 
 
60 The theoretical and empirical literature on patterns and determinants of claiming is 
voluminous and now includes research in many different countries. See William Felstiner et al., 
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
631 (1980–81) (providing a framework for studying the processes by which injurious experiences are 
or are not perceived, become grievances, and ultimately disputes); Herbert Kritzer, The Antecedents 
of Disputes: Complaining and Claiming 1 (Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Nov. 6, 2011),  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1934142 [https://perma.cc/2695-C83S] (examining what is known 
regarding the emergence of grievances and their communication as complaints and claims in several 
countries); DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1991) (broadly identifying some of these patterns for the United States). 
61  History of Federal Caseload Reporting, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22. At one time the 
case record data were recorded painstakingly by court clerks on individual case data cards that were 
sent to the AO. Id. Now they are extracted from the electronic files. Id. 
62 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database Series, INTERUNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM  POLITICAL & 
SOC. RES., https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/72 [https://perma.cc/FV9Z-CFBQ]. 
63 U.S. Courts, Civil Cover Sheet, JS-44, revised 8/16, Section VI,  http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/civil-
forms/civil-cover-sheet [https://perma.cc/H5Z9-339Q] (emphasis in original). 
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of cases flagged as class actions were included for a number of years in the 
AO’s annual reports on the business of the federal courts.64 
In the mid-1990s, in aid of its consideration of Rule 23 amendments, the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules requested that the Federal Judicial 
Center conduct an empirical study of class actions.65 As described earlier in 
Part III, when the Federal Judicial Center researchers matched the cases they 
had identified from an extensive docket and document search of class action 
activity with the records in the Integrated Database, they found that the latter 
included only seventy-one percent of the cases identified through the Federal 
Judicial Center search.66 This discrepancy might be a result of the fact that at 
the time a civil suit is filed (and the cover sheet is filled out), the suit is not, 
as a matter of law, a class action since it has not been certified (and may never 
be). Or the discrepancy could simply be a consequence of attorney failure to 
follow the instructions on the form.67 Due to the concerns that the class action 
indicator they were relying on was in error, the AO ultimately deleted 
references to class actions from their annual statistical reports. However, the 
Integrated Database still includes the class action indicator as one of the 
individual case variables. Although the Federal Judicial Center study revealed 
that relying on this indicator to count class actions underestimates the 
number of civil cases that involve some class-action-related activity,68 in the 
absence of more reliable information, analyzing the characteristics of the 
cases flagged as class actions may still have some value. 
C. Barriers to Data Access69 
For decades, scholars, educators, journalists, and others interested in the 
operations of the federal judiciary have been able to consult annual statistical 
 
64 I am still researching when the AO first reported class action statistics in its annual reports 
and when it ceased doing so. 
65 This was also the period when Congress was debating the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act. The intensive study that followed the Federal Judicial Center’s preliminary analysis 
highlighted securities class actions. See EMPIRICAL STUDY FINAL REPORT, supra note 15. 
66 Memorandum to Advisory Committee, supra note 14. 
67 Notwithstanding concern among Federal Judicial Center and AO staff about the 
unreliability of the class action indicator derived from the civil cover sheet, there has been no 
systematic attempt to analyze the reasons why the indicator is error-prone. Such an analysis might 
yield information on how to revise the cover sheet to increase reliability. 
68 EMPIRICAL STUDY FINAL REPORT, supra note 15. 
69 This discussion draws in part on discussions at the University of Pennsylvania Law School’s 
workshop, Increasing Access to Federal Court Data, October 9, 2015, organized by Jonah Gelbach, and 
discussions at the Federal Court Civil Data Project Roundtable co-sponsored by the ABA Standing 
Committee on the American Judicial System and the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies, held in 
Washington, D.C., on October 23, 2015. I am grateful to Professors Gelbach, David Engstrom, and 
Herbert Kritzer and to other participants at these meetings for sharing their experiences accessing 
federal court data. 
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reports published by the AO. These reports, previously published on paper 
only but more recently available online, offer a rich resource for analyzing 
civil and criminal litigation trends, including filings, time to disposition, and 
differences across circuits and district courts. For example, the debate over 
the “vanishing trial” was provoked initially by an analysis of published data 
on jury trial rates by Galanter,70 whose earlier research challenging assertions 
about “hyper-litigiousness” was also based on AO reports and similar reports 
from some state courts.71 For those without access to or resources for 
analyzing case-level data, these reports still offer the first and easiest way to 
gain an appreciation for what is going on in the federal courts. Given 
continuing hot controversy over Rule 23, including statistics about class action 
litigation in the AO reports would have great value. Rather than simply 
omitting data on class actions because of well-grounded concerns about the 
reliability of its current class action indicator, the Judicial Conference should 
instruct the AO or the Federal Judicial Center to conduct a study aimed at 
improving the reliability of the class action indicator.72 
A second source of information on civil case filings in federal courts is the 
Integrated Database that was created in 1970.73 The database includes a record 
for each case (civil and criminal) filed in the federal district and appellate 
courts. The civil case data include information from the civil cover sheet and 
information about case activity. Until recently the Integrated Database was 
not generally publicized as available for analysis by scholars or others, but it 
has been used routinely by Federal Judicial Center researchers as a basis for 
analyses requested by the judiciary, including the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules. During the 1990s, the database was sometimes shared by the 
Federal Judicial Center with other scholars who were conducting research on 
federal litigation. At some point in the 2000s,74 a decision was made to store 
these data in the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Science 
Research (ICPSR) archive, which is maintained by the University of 
Michigan and supported by leading universities across the United States, 
using a membership fee system.75 The archive was intended to expand access 
 
70 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matter in the Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
71 Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 15-28 (1986). 
72 The federal judiciary is now completing the rollout of its new case management and 
electronic case filing system, dubbed “NEXTGEN.” Incorporating an improved indicator of class 
action litigation does not appear to have been on the agenda of the NEXTGEN system designers. 
73 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database, 1970–2000, NATIONAL ARCHIVE 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/8429 
[https://perma.cc/4CK6-AZBR]. 
74 I have yet to be able to determine when the database was deposited in the ICPSR archive. 
However, at the time of archiving, the entire database back to 1971 was deposited. 
75 See supra footnotes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
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to research data to the academic community. Over time, it became common 
for government agencies to require, as a condition of funding, researchers 
supported by government contracts and grants to deposit their research data 
in the archive after completion of their studies. This requirement was 
intended to maximize the value of public funds invested in research. 
Depositing the federal court data files in the ICPSR archive had the 
potential to expand access to federal court records for scholarly research and 
educational purposes. For example, a law professor who wished to incorporate 
empirical data on federal tort litigation or securities cases in her lectures and 
whose university was a member of the consortium could use the database to 
produce simple tabulations and statistics to share with her students. 
Researchers could use the data to support analyses of the consequences of 
changes in statutory and case law and procedures. Ironically, however, after 
the Integrated Database was deposited in the ICPSR archive, the AO 
specified that the ICPSR data managers require that anyone wishing to access 
the data complete a Human Subjects Review process at their home 
institution.76 This process, designed to protect people who are the subjects of 
potentially harmful research, is usually time consuming and, on occasion, 
arduous.77 Although the rationale for imposing IRB requirements was never 
made clear publicly, the likely explanation was a desire to protect the privacy 
of litigating parties. However, this concern seemed incongruous, given that 
the data incorporated in the Integrated Database are derived from PACER, 
the “electronic public access service that allows users to obtain case and docket 
information online from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy 
courts . . . (which is) provided by the Federal Judiciary in keeping with its 
commitment to providing public access to court information via a centralized 
service.”78 Although any study proposing to use the civil case data would 
likely be deemed “exempt” by most Institutional Review Boards under 
current Human Subjects Protection regulations79, and any use for 
 
76 Every institution that receives federal funding is required to establish an Institutional 
Review Board and a process to review proposed research involving human subjects, typically termed 
“IRB Review.” See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2012) (setting forth the Institutional Review Board process 
and requirements). 
77 E-mail from Margaret Levenstein, Dir., Inter-University Consortium for Political and Soc. 
Sci. Research, to Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law Sch. (Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
78 PACER: PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, https://www.pacer.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/KSV5-D5PX]. Although there is a fee schedule for retrieving information from 
PACER, any member of the public can view case information or documents from a courthouse using 
public access terminals. See PACER, ELECTRONIC PUBLIC ACCESS FEE SCHEDULE (2013),  
https://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD46-V9P6] [hereinafter 
PACER FEE SCHEDULE]. 
79 E-mail from Adam Bailey, Manager, Stanford University Institutional Review Bd. (non-
medical research), to author (Sept. 8, 2016) (on file with author). As a member of the Stanford 
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instructional purposes would not come within the purview of these 
regulations at all, the requirement for review created an impediment to 
accessing case level data for research purposes. In early 2017 (after I discussed 
data access issues at this Symposium) the Integrated Database was posted on 
the Federal Judicial Center website, along with instructions for public use.80 
As useful as analysis of the Integrated Database information may be for 
some purposes, case docket and document data retrieved from federal court 
records using PACER would provide the best basis for comprehensive 
analysis of class action litigation in federal courts. The federal judiciary 
charges fees for accessing these data under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913, 1914, 1926, 1930, 
and 1932, which can make large-scale data retrieval expensive. At the 
discretion of the chief judge of each district court, exemptions may be granted 
to academic researchers, subject to specified conditions.81 Because current 
Judicial Conference policy requires separate requests to each chief judge, 
requesting fee exemptions can be a time-consuming and arduous process, and 
anecdotal information suggests that the courts’ willingness to grant 
exemptions varies by judge and perhaps also by the institutional affiliations 
of the scholars requesting exemptions.82 Moreover, the most efficient search 
routines for locating cases and documents of interest (e.g. complaints with class 
allegations, class certification motions), dubbed “web scraping,” are generally 
blocked, increasing the difficulty of retrieving data for academic research. 
D. Challenges of Linking Court Data to Other Records 
Particularly for assessing the role of class action litigation in enforcing 
market regulations, it would be useful to link court record data to other 
records containing information on public civil enforcement actions and 
criminal investigations. Currently, researchers can identify the existence of 
public actions related to private class action litigation by reviewing case-
specific documents and performing online searches for other information 
sources.83 However, as “big data” analysis becomes more prevalent, there will 
 
University Institutional Review Board, I am required to be familiar with the human subjects’ 
protection regulations and their application. 
80 Integrated Database (IDB), FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb 
[https://perma.cc/5EHE-LWSQ]. Discussions about making the database available through the 
Federal Judicial Center were long ongoing and the decision likely resulted from the joint efforts of 
the Federal Judicial Center researchers and academics interested in analyzing the data. See supra note 
69 and accompanying text. 
81 PACER FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 78. 
82 Jonah Gelbach,  Professor, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Proposal to the National Science 
Foundation for a Workshop on Increasing Access to Federal Court Data (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
83 For example, the ongoing litigation arising out of the Volkswagen “clean diesel” 
misrepresentations includes consumer and shareholder class actions, state attorney general 
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likely be opportunities for linking court records with other agency records 
and perhaps social media data as well. This potential will raise both 
information technology challenges and privacy concerns that will need to be 
addressed. Limiting access to court data will exacerbate the technical 
challenges and impede efforts to assess the relative contributions of private 
and public regulatory enforcement. 
E. Limited Desire for More Information 
Not everybody shares researchers’ enthusiasm for empirical data. Judges 
sometimes do not perceive how information that researchers are asking for 
would help them and therefore lack interest in providing it. Policy advocates 
(including those who advocate for the judiciary) sometimes fear that making 
more information available would hurt them (or their causes). 
1. “How would that information help me?” 
Several years ago, I spoke at a bench-and-bar meeting on class actions 
urging that judges require public disclosure of information related to the 
disbursement of settlements, including the number of eligible beneficiaries 
who came forward to claim, the amounts of cash compensation paid to them, 
other benefits paid pursuant to the settlement, including cy pres awards, 
coupons, insurance premiums for medical monitoring, how compensation 
payments were distributed among class members (e.g. medians, means, 
average payments to sub-groups for matrix schedules), and attorney fee 
awards.84 Much of this information is included in reports currently submitted 
to the judge who presided over a class action by plaintiff class counsel at the 
close of the lawsuit, but is currently not publicly disclosed; other information 
should be reported but is unlikely so at present. As discussed in Part IV, this 
information is critical to assessing the compensation performance of class 
actions. It is also essential for evaluating the efficacy of different approaches 
to effectuating class settlement, including notice provisions and procedures 
for submitting compensation claims that judges should review prior to 
approving a class settlement. For example, a judge who was armed with 
information on how “take-up rates” vary depending on these provisions could 
make better decisions on what standards class counsel must meet when 
designing settlement plans. However, in the press of managing cases, a judge 
 
enforcement actions, and criminal investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Volkswagen MDL, supra note 32. 
84 In 2015, a group of law faculty submitted a proposed new provision for Rule 23 calling for 
public disclosure of such information. See supra note 53. 
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might not recognize the value to him or her of making these data 
available for analysis.85 
2. “That information might hurt the causes  
and institutions I care about” 
It is well understood that information is power. Less frequently 
acknowledged is that lack of information may also confer power on those who 
seek to shape public policy. The absence of information about the 
consequences of legal policies enables policy advocates to urge adoption of 
new laws and amendments of existing rules, expanding or restricting rights 
and remedies based on anecdotes or bald assertions. Moreover, some staunch 
supporters of the federal judiciary may believe that restricting information 
about judicial activities protects individual judges and the judiciary generally 
from public criticism. The possibility that more information might impede 
private policy agendas or impair the independence of the judiciary, combined 
with the non-empirical tradition of legal scholarship, dampen interest in 
promoting data collection and analysis and broad access to data that would 
improve understanding of the consequences of Rule 23. 
CONCLUSION 
Class action litigation in the federal courts is largely the creation of the 
judiciary, which crafted Rule 23 in the 1930s, amended it in 1966, and reshaped 
and reformed it in the half-century since with only occasional interventions 
by Congress. Private and public parties were important partners in this 
process, as they filed class complaints, argued for and against certification, 
decided to settle or not, argued for or against various types of relief, and took 
appeals up to the Supreme Court. Private parties also sometimes created 
obstacles and promoted alternatives to class action litigation that influenced 
the use of class actions. Judges and lawyers together created innovative class 
action practices that found their way into the formal rule. Ultimately, 
however, it is the federal judiciary that gave life to Rule 23 and has shaped its 
development over the past fifty years. 
It is time for the federal judiciary also to take on the responsibility of 
promoting the analysis of the consequences of Rule 23. A first step in this 
direction should be to convene a task force of researchers from academia, non-
profit organizations and government agencies to identify the data necessary 
to support empirical research on the operations and consequences of Rule 23, 
 
85 Aside from its usefulness for research, making such data available publicly would also 
promote more informed reporting of class action outcomes by journalists. 
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propose revisions to current administrative reports relating to class actions, 
review barriers to data access, and recommend solutions to these problems. 
Having more data on the consequences of class actions would not end all 
arguments about whether our marriage to Rule 23 should continue. But it 
could improve the odds that we are arguing about the right issues. And it 
might improve the chances that changes in the terms of our marriage have 
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